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 CARRIAGE OF PASSENGERS BY SEA: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME 
Professor B. Soyer* and Associate Professor G. Leloudas** 
 
 
For a considerable period of time, sea carriers have benefitted from the notion of 
“freedom of contract” when it comes to contracts concerning carriage of passengers by 
sea in international voyages. The legal position has changed dramatically when the 
international community devised a regime (the Convention relating to the Carriage of 
Passengers and their Luggage by Sea, also known as the Athens Convention 1974) 
establishing a minimum degree of protection for passengers. The Athens Convention, 
amended in 2002, not only applies in jurisdictions which have incorporated it into their 
legal system but can also be contractually made part of carriage contracts, which is 
often the case as far as the cruise industry is concerned. The purpose of this article is to 
evaluate the extent to which the Athens regime serves the needs of passengers in the 
twenty first century. To this end, problematic aspects of the Athens regime have been 
identified and evaluated in the light of the solutions adopted in the context of 
international regimes regulating carriage of passengers by air in international voyages. 
As a result of this analysis, it is intended: i) to provide guidance to courts in different 
jurisdictions on how to deal with problematic aspects of the Athens regime; and ii) to 
offer insights to governments that are not currently parties to the regime but might 
consider the ratification of the Convention as to potential ambiguities that need to be 
addressed as part of the implementing legislation.    
 
 
I. Introduction 
Contrary to international developments that other modes of transport have witnessed,
1
 
freedom of contract has been the dominant notion when it comes to regulating the carriage of 
passengers by sea until the latter half of the twentieth century. However, an international 
approach intending to offer a minimum degree of protection to passengers carried by sea has 
                                                          
* Director of the Institute of International Shipping and Trade Law, Swansea University, United 
Kingdom. 
** Member of the Institute of International Shipping and Trade Law, Swansea University, United 
Kingdom.     
1
 For example, an international liability regime in relation to air passengers was established as early as 1929 by 
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, opened for 
signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (Warsaw Convention) [hereinafter WC]. The Warsaw 
regime underwent substantial modifications in the years to follow, most notably in 1955 and 1961, and the entire 
web of instruments was codified into one instrument in 1999 known also as the Convention for the Unification 
of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air, opened for signature May 28, 1999, 2242 U.N.T.S. 309 
(Montreal Convention) [hereinafter MC]. Uniform Rules concerning the Contract of International Carriage of 
Passengers by Rail, June 19, 1999 (CIV), which is an appendix to the Convention concerning International 
Carriage by Rail, May 9, 1980, 1397 U.N.T.S. 76 (COTIF) performs a similar function for passengers carried on 
international voyages. This Convention has its roots in the late nineteenth century, and has been revised a 
number of times since then.   
gradually prevailed, after a number of unsuccessful attempts made in 1960s
2
 to devise such 
an international liability regime. Finally, the international community succeeded, in their 
third attempt, to devise an international regime that provides a basic legal framework for 
passengers carried on international sea voyages, with the adaptation of the Convention 
relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by Sea on 13 December 1974 
(Athens Convention 1974).
3
  
It will be an overstatement to suggest that the Athens Convention 1974 has received 
worldwide approval, in particular in comparison with conventions designed to perform a 
similar function for passengers carried by other modes of transport.
4
 However, it is true to say 
that it has been incorporated into the legal systems of more than thirty countries from all 
around the world.
5
  
In a nutshell, the liability of the carrier is subject to a fault-based regime under the Athens 
Convention 1974. When the death of a passenger or injury to a passenger or the loss of or 
damage to his/her cabin luggage arises from a non-shipping incident, also known as a hotel 
type incident, to establish liability of the carrier, the passenger has to prove a causal 
connection between the incident and the damage, as well as actual fault attributable to the 
carrier, in order to recover.
6
 When, on the other hand, the death of a passenger or injury to a 
passenger or the loss of or damage to his/her cabin luggage arises from a shipping incident, 
the burden of proof shifts from the passenger to the carrier.
7
 In such cases, the carrier is 
presumed to be at fault, and, to avoid liability, must prove that it took all necessary 
precautions to avoid the accident. The carrier’s fault is also presumed in respect of loss of or 
damage to luggage, other than cabin luggage, irrespective of the nature of the incident from 
which the loss or damage resulted.
8
 The 1974 Convention allows carriers to limit their 
liability under the Convention,
9
 although the limits are generally regarded as low (i.e., for 
personal injury and death claims the limit is set at 46,666 SDRs per passenger). The 
                                                          
2
 The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to the Carriage of Passengers by Sea 
Apr. 29, 1961, 1411 U.N.T.S. 87; International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
Carriage of Passanger Luggage at Sea, May 27, 1967, 1967 I.M.C.O. The later never entered into force. The 
former entered into force on June 1965, but with very few ratifications (Algeria, Cuba, France, Haiti, Iran, 
Madagascar, Morocco, Peru, Switzerland, Tunisia, United Arab Republic and Zaire ratified this Convention).       
3
 Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea, Dec. 13, 1974, 1463 
U.N.T.S. 19 [hereinafter Athens Convention 1974]. It would be wrong to deem this Convention as a consumer 
protection tool. The Convention regime goes much further than that and establishes a liability regime for certain 
types of claims that passengers can bring at the same time, allowing the carrier to limit their liability in 
monetary terms and defend claims on the basis of time bar restrictions.         
4
 As of June 2017 the MC, supra note 1, has been ratified by 126 member states.   
5
 As of June 2017, the member states are: Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, China, Congo, Dominica, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Georgia, Guyana, Jordan, Liberia, Libya, Luxembourg, Malawi, Nigeria, Poland, 
Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Switzerland, Tonga, Ukraine, Vanuatu, Yemen, Hong Kong-China 
(as associated member) and Macau-China (as associated member). The Athens Convention regime has been 
incorporated, sometimes with higher limits, into the national laws of some states, such as Canada and Vietnam, 
even though these states have not officially ratified the convention. It should be noted that several states have 
recently denounced Athens Convention 1974 and ratified the 2002 version of the Convention.   
6
 See Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 3 §§ 1-2.  
7
 A “ship related incident” has been defined in Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 3 § 3 as an incident 
arising from or in connection with the shipwreck, collision, stranding, explosion or fire, or defect in the ship. 
8
 See Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 3 § 3. 
9
 See id. arts. 7-8. 
Convention also establishes that any action for damages arising out of the death of or 
personal injury to a passenger or for the loss of or damage to luggage shall be time-barred 
after a period of two years.
10
 It also provides passengers a number of alternative jurisdictions 
to bring an action arising under this Convention, provided that the court is located in a State 
Party to the Convention.
11
 
In an attempt to improve the rights of passengers under the Athens Convention 1974 and 
make the regime a more attractive proposition in terms of ratifications, the Protocol of 2002 
to the Athens Convention
12
 (Athens Convention 2002) was adopted in a diplomatic 
conference in London.
13
 The Athens Convention 2002 introduces a compulsory insurance 
regime and allows direct actions against insurers.
14
 Most importantly, the Athens Convention 
2002 has also introduced fundamental changes to the liability regime.
15
 The new regime 
provides for a two-tiered liability system for a passenger’s death or personal injury caused by 
shipwreck, capsizing, collision or stranding of the ship, explosion or fire in the ship or defect 
in the ship. In the first tier, the carrier is strictly liable up to 250,000 SDRs,
16
 unless the 
carrier proves that the accident was caused solely by an act of war; hostilities, civil war, 
insurrection or an exceptional natural phenomenon. Similarly, the carrier is exempted from 
liability were they to prove that the incident was wholly caused by an act or omission of a 
third party with the intent to cause the incident.
17
 In the second tier (i.e., above the strict 
liability limit), the carrier is liable unless they can prove that the incident causing the loss 
occurred without their fault or neglect. Therefore, a reversed burden of proof is imposed on 
the carrier for losses between 250,000 SDRs and 400,000SDRs (i.e., the maximum liability 
expressed in the amended Article 7 of the Athens Convention).
18
 The Athens Convention 
2002 does not make any change in the liability regime for personal injury and death claims 
arising out of non-ship related incidents. For such claims, the claimant must still prove that 
the carrier’s negligence has led to personal injury or death.  
                                                          
10
 Id. art. 16.  
11
 Id. art. 17. For a more comprehensive review of the Athens regime, see 1 FRANCESCO BERLINGIERI, 
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME CONVENTIONS: THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS AND PASSENGERS BY SEA § 4, at 259-293 
(2014).  
12
 Protocol of 2002 to the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage by  
Sea, 1974, Nov. 1, 2002, IMO Doc.: LEG/CONF. 13/20 of 19 Nov. 2002, available at 
http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/corrgr/dipcon/20.pdf [hereinafter Athens Convention 2002]. 
13
 For a discussion on the Athens Convention 2002, see Barış Soyer, Sundry Considerations on the Draft 
Protocol to the Athens Convention relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage by Sea 1974, J. 
MAR. L. & COM. 519 (2002); Erik Røsæg, News under the Athens Sun—New Principles and Lost Opportunities 
of the Athens Convention 2002, 46 SCANDINAVIAN STUD. L. 153 (2004); Robert D. Peltz, The Athens 
Convention Revisited, J. MAR. L. & COM. 491 (2012). 
14
 See Athens Convetion 2002, supra note 12, art. 4bis. 
15
 See id. art. 3.         
16
 The carrier is required to obtain compulsory insurance in respect of the death of and personal injury to 
passengers up to this figure (id. art. 4bis). 
17
 Id. art. 4. Similar exceptions appear in other conventions adopting a strict liability regime; see, e.g., 
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage 1992 art. III § 2, Nov. 27, 1992, 1956 
U.N.T.S 255; International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the 
Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea art.7 § 2, May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1406 (not yet in force). 
18
 The other main changes that have been brought about by the protocol are: an increase of 25 percent on 
luggage claims; allowing the court seized to suspend the operation or interrupt the running of the two-year time 
limit; and the possibility for regional integration organisations, such as the EU, to sign the new Convention with 
the same rights and obligations as a nation state.         
 The Athens Convention 2002 entered into force on 23 April 2014,
19
 and, perhaps more 
fundamentally, the European Union adopted it into EU law by virtue of Council Regulation 
392/2009 before the Convention came into force internationally. The Regulation not only 
intends to provide a uniform liability regime for passengers carried by sea, but it also extends 
the scope of application of the Athens Convention 2002 to domestic carriage and inland 
waterways.
20
  
 
To what extent the Athens Convention 2002 will achieve uniformity within the EU through 
the implementation of this Regulation is questionable, given that no attempt has been made in 
the relevant Regulation to iron out the uncertainties surrounding certain provisions. However, 
we do not intend to be involved in a discussion on the potential pitfalls of the Council 
Regulation.
21
 Our enquiry goes much wider. Our objective is to analyse the extent to which 
the Athens Convention 2002 provides a sound and reliable liability regime for passengers 
carried by sea. To this end, the meaning and scope of several ambiguous provisions of the 
Athens Convention 2002 will be evaluated and critically analysed. In the course of this 
analysis, comparisons will be made with the international regimes dealing with the liability of 
air carriers to their passengers. The authors are well aware that the international air liability 
regimes have been developed against the backdrop of a different era and there are significant 
differences between these two modes of transport. However, it is also undeniable that legal 
jurisprudence on international air liability regimes is fertile. It is feasible that such a 
comparative approach could provide an impressive guidance as to how to resolve ambiguities 
in the Athens Convention 2002, especially with regard to provisions that have general 
applicability (i.e., provisions not dealing with issues unique to sea transport). It is hoped that 
the article will serve the following two objectives: i) providing guidance to courts in 
Contracting States on how to deal with problematic issues and provisions of the Athens 
Conventions; and ii) offering insights to governments (such as Australia and Singapore), that 
are not members to the Athens regime but might consider the ratification of the Athens 
Convention 2002, as to potential ambiguities that need to be addressed in the implementing 
legislation.    
 
Considering that most cruise line conditions commonly seek to contractually incorporate the 
provisions of the Athens Convention 1974, it is evident that the deliberations in this article 
                                                          
19
 As of June 2017, the member states to the Athens Convention 2002 are: Albania, Belgium, Belize, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Marshall Islands, Montenegro, 
Netherlands, Norway, Palau, Panama, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Syrian 
Arab Republic, United Kingdom and European Union.   
20
 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) 392/2009 of Apr. 23, 2009, The Liability of Carriers of 
Passengers by Sea in the Event of Accidents, 2009 O.J. (L 131) 24 also makes the following major changes in 
this area: 
- removal of the possibility for Member States under the Athens Convention 2002 to fix limits of 
liability higher than those provided for in the Convention (art. 4); 
- making advance payment in the event of the death of, or personal injury to, a passenger (art. 5); and 
- providing detailed pre-journey information to passengers (art. 6).    
21
 A discussion of that nature has been carried out in Barış Soyer, Boundaries of the Athens Convention: What 
You See is not Always What You Get, in LIABILITY REGIMES IN CONTEMPORARY MARITIME LAW c. 11, at 183-
206 (Rhidian D. Thomas ed., 2007).  
could be relevant even in jurisdictions (such as the United States of America) that have not 
implemented the Athens regime into their legal system.
22
 
 
Before analysing the problematic aspects of the Athens regime in Part III, Part II provides an 
overview of how the liability regime in the aviation sector has developed. It highlights the 
main differences with the Athens regime and provides some answers as to why the liability 
regime of the former has developed in a radically different fashion.  
 
 
 
II- An Overview of the Development of the International Air Carriage Regime for 
Passengers  
 
 
The liability of air carriers for the death or bodily injury of passengers sustained during their 
international carriage by air is regulated by the Warsaw Convention System (WCS) and the 
Montreal Convention 1999 (MC). 
  
The WCS is a blend of the following international law instruments: 
  
(i) the original Warsaw Convention 1929 (WC);23  
(ii) the Hague Protocol 1955 amending the WC (WC/HP);24  
(iii) the Guadalajara Convention 1961 supplementing the WC or the WC/HP 
(GC);
25
  
(iv) the Guatemala City Protocol 1971 (GCP) amending the WC/HP;26 and  
(v) the Montreal Additional Protocols Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 of 1975 (MP1, MP2, 
MP3, MP4) amending the WC (MP1), the WC/HP (MP2 and MP4) and the 
GCP (MP3).
27
  
                                                          
22
 The cruise sector is gigantic in North America. In 2016, 12.41 million passengers were carried by the North 
American cruise industry.  This is larger than the total of cruise passengers carried in Europe, Australia, and 
Asia during the same period, which was 11.84 million (source:   
https://www.statista.com/statistics/301598/number-of-guests-of-the-global-cruise-industry-by-region/) (last 
tested 1 July 2017).  
23
 WC, supra note 1.  
24
 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by 
Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929, opened for signature Sept. 28, 1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter 
WC/HP].      
25
 Convention Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention Relating to Unification of Certain Rules in 
International Carriage by Air Performed by a Non-contractual Carrier, Signed at Guadalajara on Sept. 18, 1961, 
510 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GC].  
26
 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by 
Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929, as Amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on 28 Sept. 1955, 
opened for signature Mar. 8, 1971,10 I.L.M. 613, ICAO Doc. 8932 [hereinafter GCP]. The GCP never came 
into force.   
27
 Additional Protocol No. 1 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929, as Amended by the Protocol done at The 
Hague on 28 Sept. 1955, opened for signature Sept. 25, 1975, ICAO Doc. 9145 [hereinafter MP1]; Additional 
Protocol No. 2 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage 
 The MC was the long-awaited reaction to this assortment of laws. It is a stand-alone 
international convention that gradually replaces the WCS. It will take over when all the State 
Parties of the WCS ratify the MC.
28
 Its overarching aim is to consolidate the liability system 
governing passengers and air carriers into one instrument and modernise it by tilting the 
balance in favour of passengers.  
 
From the outset, it needs to be stressed that the international liability regime for air 
passengers was developed at a time when the aviation sector was going through a trial-and-
error learning process. The technological mishaps of flying adversely affected passengers 
and, to a lesser extent, innocent bystanders on the ground. This inevitably led to the adoption 
of a protectionist approach when developing the WC in the 1920s. This was a time when sea 
carriers were still enjoying the benefits of the traditional freedom of contract which 
underpinned maritime law for centuries. This further explains why the liability of air carriers 
was based on a presumption of fault under the WC with limited contractual exclusions 
permitted,
29
 whilst sea carriers could contractually exclude or limit their liability against their 
passengers. It took the international community half a century before making sea carriers 
subject to a similar liability regime, providing a minimal degree of protection to sea 
passengers with the introduction of the Athens Convention 1974.           
 
With air travel becoming part of the mainstream, especially in the Western world, with the 
middle classes of Western countries being its main customers by the 1980s, the public’s 
tolerance for technological mishaps causing substantial losses of life gradually disappeared. 
Media attention to the aftermath of aviation accidents contributed to this tendency, as it 
ensured that the international air liability regime was in the spotlight after each loss of an 
aircraft. Paradoxically, the insurance sector’s attitude to liability issues gradually became 
more relaxed as accident data on individual air carriers, airports, routes and geographical 
areas of operations became easily available. Liability insurers began to calculate their 
maximum exposure with accuracy by making use of such data, which in turn enabled them to 
make provision for losses in terms of premium rates and investment return. These factors 
accelerated the adoption of a better liability regime for air passengers in the 1990s. Under the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929, as Amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on 28 Sept. 1955, 
opened for signature Sept. 25, 1975, ICAO Doc. 9146 [hereinafter MP2]; Additional Protocol No. 3 to Amend 
the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw 
on 12 Oct. 1929, as Amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on 28 Sept. 1955 and at Guatemala City on 8 
March 1971, opened for signature Sept. 25, 1975, ICAO Doc. 9147 [hereinafter MP3]; The MP3 never came 
into force following the fate of the GCP. Additional Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, Signed at Warsaw on 12 Oct. 1929, as 
Amended by the Protocol done at The Hague on 28 Sept. 1955, opened for signature Sept. 25, 1975, reprinted in 
Sec. Rep. No. 105-20 [hereinafter MP4]. 
28
 MC, supra note 1, art. 55.  
29
 Under the WCS the claimants had the burden of establishing that (i) there has been an “accident” which (ii) 
took place on board the aircraft or during the operations of embarking or disembarking and (iii) caused the 
passenger’s death, or bodily injury (art. 17). The burden was then reversed to the carrier to establish the two 
available defences, namely that (i) it has taken all necessary measures to avoid the damage or that it was 
impossible for them to take such measures (art. 20 § 1); or (ii) the death/bodily injury was caused by or 
contributed by the passenger (art. 21).  
MC, a two-tiered system of liability has been created. Air carriers are now strictly liable for 
death or bodily injury caused by accidents that take place on board an aircraft or in the 
process of embarkation/disembarkation, up to 113,000 SDRs.
30
 Their only defence in this 
first tier is to prove that the damage was caused or contributed by the negligence or other 
wrongful act or omission of the claimant.
31
 For damages exceeding this amount, the carrier 
bears unlimited liability, having the burden to establish the following three available 
defences: namely, that the damage was caused by or contributed to by the negligence or other 
wrongful act or omission of the claimant;
32
 that the damage was not due to the negligence or 
other wrongful act or omission of the carrier or its servants or agents;
33
 or that the damage 
was solely caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of a third party.
34
  
  
The Athens Convention 2002 introduced a strict liability regime as well, yet only for personal 
injury and death claims arising from shipping incidents. Still, sea carriers and, in particular 
their liability insurers, were not prepared to accept a regime of unlimited liability. It is not 
within the realm of this article to elaborate why the sea carriage regime has been developed in 
a more conservative fashion compared to the air carriage regime. However, it can be safely 
said that the following two issues in particular were of major concern for liability insurers: i) 
the fact that a large cruise liner could carry up to 6,000–7,000 passengers;35 and ii) 
passengers on board ships are likely to be more mobile compared to aircraft passengers and, 
therefore, the risk of a ship’s passengers suffering personal injury is significantly greater. 
 
However, as indicated above, the fact that aviation has adopted a different liability regime to 
that of sea does not mean that the latter has nothing to learn from the former’s development 
of the law and practice. In fact, as illustrated in this Part, the development of the air carriage 
regime has influenced the evolution of the liability regime under the Athens Conventions. 
Therefore, the authors will refer, where necessary, to the solutions adopted by the air carriage 
regimes in their quest to identify how the Athens Convention 2002 can be modified or 
interpreted to provide a better global liability regime for passengers carried by sea.       
   
                                                          
30
 MC, supra note 1, art. 17 and art. 21 § 1 (The limit is currently set at 113,000 SDRs. Art. 24 provides that the 
limit is to be reviewed every five years by reference to an inflation factor; if the factor exceeds 10 percent, the 
limit will be increased accordingly, unless a majority of State Parties disapprove) 
31
 See id. art. 20.  
32
 Id. art. 20.  
33
 Id. art. 21 § 2 (a). 
34
 Id. art. 21 § 2 (b).  
35
 The Oasis of the Seas, operated by Royal Caribbean International Ltd, could carry up to 7,144 passengers at 
maximum capacity.    
 III. Issues concerning Definition of Key Notions under the Athens Regime 
 
A) Scope of the Athens Regime 
 
Under the Athens regime (both 1974 and 2002), the Convention is applicable when a contract 
of carriage is made by or on behalf of a carrier for the carriage of a passenger, with or without 
his/her luggage on a ship.
36
 Not surprisingly, the drafters made no attempt to define what a 
contract is, leaving its determination to the national laws of the Contracting States. This is 
likely to create difficulties, especially in common law jurisdictions, where it is necessary that 
both parties provide consideration for the contract.
37
 Is there, for example, a contract of 
carriage, if a passenger is given a free ticket from the operators of the ship as a result of an 
advertising promotion?
38
 The legislation incorporating the Athens Convention 1974 into UK 
law expressly stipulated that “any reference in the Convention to a contract of carriage 
excludes a contract of carriage which is not for reward.”39 This kind of clarification is useful, 
but problems could still arise in some cases. It is not uncommon practice for ferry operators 
to issue tickets free of charge to youngsters travelling with adults. In that case, would the 
ticket issued for the youngster come under the Convention regime? Technically the contract 
is not for reward, but it is also plausible to argue that a contract with a youngster is issued 
only when an adult ticket is purchased. In that case the passenger’s payment for his/her ticket 
would provide adequate consideration for his/her contract and the contract of the youngster.
40
  
A problem of this nature is unlikely to arise in the context of the air carriage conventions. 
This is because both the MC and the WCS provide that they are applicable to gratuitous 
carriage performed by an air transport undertaking.
41
 The term “air transport undertaking” is 
not defined in the conventions, leaving its interpretation to national laws. In the UK the term 
is currently defined, for regulatory purposes, in the Transport Act 2000 as an undertaking that 
provides “services for the carriage by air of passengers or cargo for hire or reward”, a 
definition that is not particularly helpful in our case.
42
 The following more helpful definition 
was included in the Air Navigation Order 2005 (ANO 2005): “Air transport undertaking 
                                                          
36
 By virtue of Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 2; Athens Convention 2002, supra note 12, art. 2,  the 
voyage must be of an international character, but it is open to Contracting States to extend the application of the 
Convention to domestic voyages.    
37
 Eleanor Thomas v. Benjamin Thomas (1842) 2 QB 851 (Eng.).   
38
 Conversely, under Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Passengers and Luggage by 
Road, art. 1 § 1, Mar. 1, 1979, 1774 U.N.T.S. 109, a passenger has been described as “any person who, in the 
performance of a contract of carriage made by him or on his behalf, is carried either for reward or gratuitously 
by a carrier”.  
39
 Merchant Shipping Act 1995, c. 21, pt. II, sched. 6, § 9 (U.K.) [hereinafter MSA 1995].  
40
 It is worth noting that the Canadian enactment of the Athens Convention extends the application of the 
Convention to all passengers of commercial or public craft carried by water, whether or not they are being 
carried pursuant to a contract (Marine Liability Act, 2001 S.C., c. 6, § 37(2) (Can.)). However, the Convention 
would not apply when a visitor makes use of a boat for accommodation purposes: Buhlman v. Buckley (2011), 
330 D.L.R. 6th 755 (Can.). 
41
 MC, supra note 1, art. 1 § 1; WC, supra note 1, art. 1 § 1. 
42
 Transport Act 2000, c. 38, § 95(5) (U.K.).  
means an undertaking whose business includes the undertaking of flights for the purposes of 
public transport of passengers or cargo.”43 However, the term has disappeared from the latest 
ANOs, namely of 2009 and 2016. Still, there is no doubt that a commercial air carrier would 
qualify as such and the transport of an under-two-year-old for free would trigger the 
application of the aviation conventions. A consensus seems to have developed among courts 
that to be an “air transport undertaking” for the Conventions, the relevant entity or person is 
required to “provide air carriage as part of a commercial enterprise even though aviation is 
not its principal activity”;44 or “even if air transport is only a small or subordinate part of the 
whole business”.45 It has even been suggested that the only flights excluded are “casual, 
isolated flights when a free ride is afforded by an owner not engaged in the business 
(enterprise) of flying”.46  
 A more difficult question arises when a pregnant woman sustains injuries while she is 
carried on board a vessel that result in the child being later born with disabilities. There is no 
doubt that under English law the child would be able to bring an action against the carrier for 
personal injuries suffered, but it is debatable whether such claim can be brought under the 
Athens Convention or different national legal regime. The claim will fall under the Athens 
regime if the unborn child is carried as a passenger or if he/she can be viewed as a third-party 
beneficiary of a contract under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999.
47
 If that 
course of action fails, a claim by the unborn child could be brought under the Congenital 
Disabilities Act 1976. However, any action brought under the national legal system will be 
outside the Athens regime,
48
 which means that the carrier will benefit from global limitation 
figures rather than those set out in the Athens Convention.
49
 Courts might, of course, find it 
unacceptable that a mother who is injured during carriage is subjected to a different legal 
regime than her unborn child who is injured as a result of the same incident. Such policy 
argument might encourage them to find that the foetus has the status of a passenger under the 
Convention, but this outcome is far from certain.   
                                                          
43
 Air Navigation Order 2005 (SI 1970/2005) §155 (U.K.). 
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The authors know of no reported cases of this nature under the aviation conventions. Yet, the 
recent decision of the CJEU on Air Baltic Corporation AS
50
 might be relevant, as it 
confirmed that a contract of carriage by air can be concluded with a third party for the benefit 
of the actual passenger.
51
 In this case the tickets were paid by the employer, but issued in the 
names of its employees, who were the actual passengers transported. The air carrier was held 
liable to the employer for damage occasioned by delay to the carriage of its employees.  
Still, it will be an over-stretching of the boundaries of the aviation conventions to use this 
decision to argue that the unborn child is a beneficiary of the mother’s contract of carriage. 
Firstly, case -law is clear that a passenger, gratuitous or otherwise, must have consented to 
the carriage in question by means of a contract. The existence of such consent explains why 
the aviation conventions have been held not to apply to “…stowaways, persons on the flight 
to be expelled from the State of departure, persons employed by the carrier to carry out 
routine maintenance, flight attendants, and student pilots... [T]hey have not contracted for 
carriage as such…”. 52 What the CJEU decision seems to suggest is that, while it is irrelevant 
whether the third, contracting party is a passenger or not, the beneficiary must qualify as a 
passenger. Secondly, air tickets usually bear the name of the passenger and do not permit 
substitutions or transfers. As such, it is difficult to identify the unborn child as a member of a 
class or of a particular description per s. 1(3) of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 
1999.  
If the action under the aviation conventions fails, it is doubtful whether a claim under the 
Congenital Disabilities Act 1976 would be successful. The concept of exclusivity is central to 
the application of the aviation conventions.
53
 The prevailing view argues that the claimant is 
precluded from bringing a claim against the carrier under national law for an incident that 
took place during international carriage, even when the carrier is not liable under the 
Conventions. English courts have demonstrated remarkable consistency in the application of 
the exclusivity principle.
54
 Most recently, the Supreme Court in the case of Stott v. Thomas 
Cook Operators Ltd. 
55
 dismissed the claim of a disabled passenger against the tour operator 
brought under the UK Disability Regulations. 
56
 The relevant incident took place on board the 
aircraft, yet the claim was brought under the Regulations because they permit recovery for 
injury to feelings, which is not recoverable under the MC (or the WCS). The Supreme Court 
was quick to dismiss the claim by applying the principle of exclusivity:  
Should a claim for damages for ill treatment in breach of equality laws as a general class, 
or, more specifically, should a claim for damages for failure to provide properly for the 
needs of a disabled passenger, be regarded as outside the substantive scope of the 
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Convention? As to the general question, my answer is no… [W]hat matters is not the 
quality of the cause of action but the time and place of the accident or mishap. The 
Convention is intended to deal comprehensively with the carrier’s liability for whatever 
may physically happen to passengers between embarkation and disembarkation.
57
 
It is clear that the matter (i.e., whether the international carriage regime(s) should govern an 
action brought by an unborn child injured during the course of transit) remains unsolved 
under both the sea and the air convention regimes. It is fair to say that authorities in the 
context of carriage by air seem to suggest that the international regime should govern such an 
action. This would be the preferred solution of the authors under the Athens regime too.  
Article 1(3) defines a ship that comes under the Athens Convention 1974/2002 as a “sea-
going vessel, excluding an air-cushion vehicle”. It is clear that air-cushion vessels, such as 
hovercraft, are excluded from the scope of the Athens Convention 1974/2002.
58
 Yet, the 
Convention provides no further guidance as to the physical attributes a craft should carry to 
be considered as a “ship”.59 Similarly, it is not clear what the term “sea going” means. For 
example, would the Convention apply to passengers who purchase tickets for a ride on an 
inflatable raft?
60
 The answer depends on i) whether such a craft can be considered a “ship” 
under national law
61
 and ii) whether it is adequate that the craft is capable of proceeding to 
sea, or essential that it actually goes to sea.
62
 If the latter is correct, a vessel operated within a 
harbour to provide sight-seeing tours for tourists will possibly not be regarded as sea-going. 
Therefore, there is a genuine possibility that in case of an accident, passengers who purchase 
a ticket for a ride on an inflatable raft in Barbados will be treated differently than those who 
enjoy a similar ride on the coast of Dominica (both of whom are parties to the Athens 
Convention 1974).  
A final point on the scope of the Athens Convention 1974/2002 relates to the definition of 
“carrier”. By virtue of Article 1 of the Convention “carrier” means a person by or on behalf 
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of whom a contract of carriage has been concluded, whether the carriage is actually 
performed by that person or by a performing carrier.
63
 The definition of “carrier” is very 
wide, suggesting that anybody who has been involved in the process of establishing a 
contractual relationship with the passenger could possibly, regardless of their status, be 
regarded as the contractual carrier.
64
 Therefore, a tour operator could be treated as “carrier” 
under the Convention although the actual sea transport is performed by another carrier.
65
 This 
is not necessarily an adverse development for passengers, as it enables them to bring an 
action against tour operators in cases of mishaps occurring at the sea leg of a package 
holiday. However, legal complications might arise if national or EU law provides a different 
liability regime for package holidays. A question will arise whether the provisions of the 
Athens Convention or legislation which is designed to deal with package holidays would 
apply in such a case.
66
 Any such difficulty can be easily avoided at the implementation level, 
if the legislator is aware that the definition of “carrier” under the Athens regime could 
possibly create a conflict with legislation dealing with package holidays.  
The definitions of contracting and actual (performing) carrier are more detailed in the 
aviation conventions, yet not necessarily more restrictive. Both contracting and actual carriers 
are subject to the provisions of the MC (and the Guadalajara Convention of the WCS).
67
 The 
contracting carrier is the person that “as a principal makes a contract of carriage governed by 
the Convention with a passenger… or with a person acting on behalf of the passenger”;68 the 
actual carrier is the person who “performs, by virtue of authority from the contracting 
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… I do not consider that the [Athens] Convention is concerned with status at all: there is nothing 
which confines its application to concerns in the nature of shipping lines. Basically what emerge 
from the Convention are two categories: 
 (1) the carrier—being the person by or on whose behalf a contract of carriage has been 
concluded; and 
 (2) the performing carrier—being the person to whom such carriage is entrusted. 
As I see it, the essential question is whether, as between the claimants and the [tour operators] 
there was a contract of carriage by sea: if so then the [tour operators] assumed responsibilities as 
carriers, with the word carrier being used in a non-technical sense… The matter is very largely 
one of impression, but for my part I see no difficulty in saying that the [tour operators] were 
carriers, in that the agreement with the claimants included obligations pertaining to carriage by sea 
and to that extent, it represented a contract for the carriage by sea of the claimants by the [tour 
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carrier, the whole or part of the carriage, but is not with respect to such part a successive 
carrier within the meaning of this Convention”.69 The definition of contracting carriers is 
wide enough to include tour operators. Yet, it would exclude travel agents issuing tickets on 
behalf of air carriers or tour operators. As was recently demonstrated in the West Caribbean 
case,
70
 there is no requirement for a contracting carrier to operate aircraft: a US shell-
company (Newvac) was found to be “a contracting carrier” under the MC for having leased 
aircraft and crew from the actual carrier (West Caribbean Airways) and in turn contracting 
for the seating capacity of the aircraft (and other holiday-related services) with a travel agent 
(Globe Trotter) which eventually sold the individual tickets to the passengers.  
Furthermore, the court held that Globe Trotter was acting on behalf of the passengers, 
although none was identified at the time of its contract with Newvac: “Newvac and Globe 
Trotter clearly contemplated that Globe Trotter would procure passengers for the flights and 
the fully inclusive tour packages that were to be supplied by Newvac, and that Globe Trotter 
would act on behalf of the passengers in this regard...”.71 
Therefore, both international regimes provide for wide definitions of carrier that can be 
extended to cover tour operators. This is not necessarily a bad solution. Still, it is one that 
needs to be borne in mind, especially when states implement the Athens regime into their law 
to avoid any potential conflict with national law designed to deal with the legal position of 
tour operators.   
 
B) Identifying the Basis of Liability  
In both versions of the Athens regime, the liability regime that governs claims for personal 
injury or loss of life, or damage to or loss of luggage, depends on the source of the incident 
that gives rise to the claim. The Conventions draw a distinction between “shipping incidents” 
and “non-shipping incidents”. In the 1974 version of the Convention, an incident is deemed 
to be shipping-related if the death of or personal injury to the passenger, or the loss of or 
damage to the cabin luggage, arose from or in connection with the “shipwreck, collision, 
stranding, explosion or fire, or defect in the ship”.72 It is evident that this definition is very 
general and could lead to disputes in many instances. For example, in its technical sense 
“collision” occurs only between two ships. Therefore, if the ship carrying passengers comes 
into contact with a fixed object, would that be treated as a shipping incident? Considering the 
ethos behind the relevant provision (i.e., providing a favourable liability regime for 
passengers in case of a casualty emerging from ship operations), one might be inclined to 
answer this question in a positive fashion. Still, it is possible that this issue might be the focus 
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of litigation. More challenging questions would surround the concept of “defect in the ship”. 
As no further attempt has been made to clarify the meaning of this term, it is certainly 
arguable that food poisoning caused by corrosion of the stoves in the kitchen of the ship is 
attributable to a “defect in the ship”. By the same token, injury caused by the malfunctioning 
of the sliding doors in the restaurant of a cruise ship could be attributable to a “defect in the 
ship”. The authors do not believe that it was the intention of the draftsmen to attribute such a 
wide meaning to the term “defect in the ship”. This kind of expansive construction has the 
potential of converting the hotel type of incidents into shipping-related incidents. 
Unfortunately, the wording is far from perfect and one can see how it can create confusion.    
Appreciating the pitfalls of such lenient drafting, an attempt has been made in the 2002 
version of the Athens Convention to offer a comprehensive definition of a shipping incident. 
The Athens Convention 2002 describes it as “shipwreck, capsizing, collision or stranding of 
the ship, explosion or fire in the ship, or defect in the ship”.73 The addition of the word 
“capsizing” is intended to clarify that an incident that does not necessarily cause damage or 
destruction to the ship, but nevertheless leads to personal injury or death as a result of the 
ship overturning keel up and deck down, will still be viewed as a shipping incident for the 
purpose of determining the relevant liability regime.
74
 It is debatable whether the word 
“capsizing” would cover a situation where the ship takes a significant list, during which death 
of or injuries to passengers occur, and then comes back upright. Considering the justification 
for adding the word “capsize” to the definition, it is the view of the authors that this kind of 
incident (e.g. listing of the vessel) should be regarded as a shipping incident. It is also made 
explicit in the definition that the explosion or fire must be directly connected with the ship or 
her cargo. Interestingly, though, it seems that the definition does not make an inquiry as to 
the cause of the fire and explosion. Therefore, fire on board of the ship that causes personal 
injury or death should be treated as a shipping incident regardless of whether it has been 
started as a result of negligence of a group of passengers
75
 or negligence of the cook!        
More fundamentally, a defect in the ship has been described as “any malfunction, failure or 
non-compliance with applicable safety regulations in respect of any part of the ship or its 
equipment when used for the escape, evacuation, embarkation and disembarkation of 
passengers, or when used for the propulsion, steering, safe navigation, mooring, anchoring, 
arriving at or leaving berth or anchorage, or damage control after flooding; or when used for 
the launching of life saving appliances”.76 This is a thorough definition that possibly provides 
answers to the questions raised above under the 1974 version of the Convention. Still, there 
might be borderline cases where it is debatable whether the cause of the incident is shipping 
related or not. Think of a situation where the passenger, prior to the ship’s sailing, steps into 
an open engine hatch left by contractors who were distracted by an impending emergency. 
                                                          
73
 Athens Convention 2002, supra note 12, art. 4 amends Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 3.    
74
 The use of the word “chavirement” in the French text leaves no doubt that this was the intended outcome of 
the amendment.   
75
 However, if carrier can prove that the loss was caused or contributed to by the fault or neglect of the 
passenger making a claim, the court seized may exonerate the carrier wholly or partly from their liability in 
accordance with the provisions of the law of that court by virtue of Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 
6; Athens Convention 2002, supra note 12, art. 6.  
76
 Athens Convention 2002, supra note 12, art. 4 amends Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 3.    
There is no doubt that the incident is attributable to failure or non-compliance with safety 
regulations in respect of a part of the ship. However, the definition provides that the incident 
must also arise when the relevant part of the ship is used for the escape, evacuation, 
embarkation and disembarkation of passengers or for the propulsion, steering, safe 
navigation, mooring, etc. Given that the vessel, in our example, was not in the course of 
navigation and the relevant part was not used in embarkation, disembarkation, escape, 
evacuation, propulsion, or steering, the carrier might challenge any suggestion that the loss 
has resulted from a shipping incident.
77
 A more difficult case is when a ship is attacked by 
pirates as a result of a security failure on the part of the crew, claiming the lives of 
passengers. It is possible to argue that the crew is part of the ship and their failure to comply 
with safety regulations to ensure safe navigation of the ship would mean that the loss relates 
to a shipping incident, even though the pirates are external to the ship.
78
 These issues aside, it 
is undeniable that the definitions provided in the 2002 version of the Convention mark a huge 
improvement on the definitions that appear in the 1974 version of the Convention.   
The aviation conventions do not make such fine distinctions. The liability of air carriers for 
the death or bodily injury of a passenger is governed by Article 17, which provides that “[t]he 
carrier is liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily injury of a passenger upon 
condition only that the accident which caused the death or injury took place on board the 
aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.” In that 
respect, their liability depends on the nature of the incident causing the death or bodily injury 
(“accident”) and the location of the accident (from the moment of embarkation, while on 
board the aircraft and until disembarkation from the aircraft is completed).  
Article 17 is arguably the most litigated provision of the Conventions, and a thorough 
examination of the jurisprudence is outside the scope of this paper. Yet, a few relevant 
thoughts are in order.
79
 An “accident” for the purposes of the conventions has been defined as 
an “unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger… [and not 
his/her] own internal reaction to the usual, normal and expected operation of the aircraft”.80 
Courts initially linked the “unusual” event to the technical operation of the aircraft, rightly 
holding that heavy landings or aircraft crashes that result in death or bodily injury of 
passengers qualify as accidents under the conventions.
81
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At the same time, courts looked for unusual events in the cabin and held that “a fall in an 
aircraft toilet caused by some slippery material, probably soap, on the floor [or] the fall onto a 
passenger of an object from an overhead locker” are accidents.82 Still, courts declined to find 
an accident when a passenger fell in the cabin as a result of “shoes or blanket bags or rubbish 
on the cabin floor”.83 These items are routinely found in the cabin floor and there is nothing 
unusual regarding their position. Similarly, falling “on a plastic strip associated with the seat 
tracking” is not an accident as the strip is permanently placed on the floor of the aircraft.84  
The prevailing definition of accident provides that the passenger’s internal reaction to a 
normal flight cannot qualify as an accident.
85
 This element has been used by courts to prevent 
recovery for death or bodily injuries caused by the passenger’s medical condition during an 
uneventful flight, such as heart attacks, hearing loss caused by the normal depressurisation of 
the cabin during landing, or (deep vein) thrombosis caused by the cramped conditions of 
economy class.
86
 In such situations, yet again, there was nothing untoward with the technical 
operation of the aircraft that might have caused the injuries in question.  
Over the years, courts have interpreted the term “accident” in a flexible manner in two 
respects.
87
 Firstly, they looked to the cabin crew as a potential source of unexpected 
behaviour. In that respect, “the supply of infected food, causing food poisoning… [and] the 
spilling of hot coffee into a passenger's lap (whether as a result of turbulence, mere 
inattention on the part of a member of the cabin staff or the acts of another passenger)” 
constitute accidents for the purposes of Art 17.
88
 Most importantly, the refusal of cabin crew 
to assist a passenger with a health issue during flight, or the failure to divert a flight to a 
nearby airport following a medical emergency on board, have also been found to be unusual 
events triggering the liability of the air carrier.
89
 Secondly, courts have rejected (admittedly 
reluctantly) the argument that Art 17 requires the injury-causing event to be a “risk 
characteristic” to air travel, what in the Athens regime would be described as a “shipping 
incident”. This has opened the door for torts committed by fellow passengers to be 
considered accidents. Still, it is difficult to discern a principled approach by courts which, in 
general, will try to link the accident to the operation of the aircraft or the behavior of the 
crew. For example, sexual assaults by one passenger on another during flight triggered the 
application of Art 17 on the basis that “the close proximity of economy class passengers and 
the fact that they were in darkness” were characteristics of air travel.90   
At the same time, courts tend to treat hijackings and other terrorism-related events as 
accidents although the air carrier is usually unable to foresee or prevent them
91—in essence 
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ignoring the “all necessary measures” defence (in the WCS) and the fault-defences of the MC 
for claims above 113,000SDRs. This is the result of the Saks decision “reject[ing] the 
limitation that the event must be… unintentional” to qualify as an accident.92 
What the colorful history of the interpretation of the term “accident” demonstrates is the 
misjudgment of setting up a liability system on a term that is susceptible to change alongside 
technological evolution and social perceptions. In the 1920s the term “accident” was 
representing the unknown that exceeds technological capabilities, whereas today there is no 
such thing as an “unpredictable” accident anymore.93 Still, the attempts to replace the term 
“accident” with the less contentious “event” have always failed on the basis that such change 
will increase insurance costs, especially if recovery for personal injuries (as distinguished 
from bodily injuries) is also permitted. The side-effect of these decisions was to create 
disproportionate levels of litigation worldwide; a development that certainly defies the hailed 
aim of the MC as a convention for consumers.  
In that respect, the drafting of the Athens Protocol is to be praised in two respects. Firstly, the 
term “incident” is less contentious than the term “accident”, as it does not need to be sudden 
or unforeseeable, and it makes no difference whether it is a natural occurrence or the conduct 
of the carrier or a third party.
94
 Secondly, a clear statement that shipping and non-shipping 
incidents are included in the cover of the Protocol, albeit under different liability regimes, is 
welcomed. Admittedly, this approach raises issues of delimitation with the claimants 
attempting to broaden the scope of what shipping-related incidents are to take advantage of 
the preferential liability regime. Yet, overall this structure avoids disputes over the question 
whether the incident shall be causally connected to the operation of the mode of transport. 
 
C)  Damages Recoverable  
Under the Convention, the carrier is obliged to compensate a passenger for loss suffered as a 
result of the death of the passenger or personal injury suffered by him. However, the relevant 
provision makes no attempt to define the meaning of personal injury other than stating that 
“loss shall not include punitive or exemplary damages”.95 It has been apparently left to the 
national laws to determine what qualifies as personal injury. For example, would it be 
possible for a passenger to claim loss caused by mental (psychiatric) injury suffered as a 
result of a shipping-related casualty? Under common law, if a passenger is injured or loses 
his/her life during carriage, action for damages caused by pain and suffering, including 
suffering for distress, would be recoverable on the premise that such an action would be 
effective  in tort as much as in contract.
96
 However, with the introduction of the Athens 
regime into English law, and in particular considering that all claims against the carrier must 
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be brought under the Convention by virtue of Article 14, the key issue is to establish what 
kind of damages would be recoverable as “personal injury” under the Convention. Courts in 
some Contracting States have already shown willingness to allow claims of this nature.
97
 
However, there is certainly no uniform view on the matter.  
The drafters of the aviation conventions have rejected references to personal injury.
98
 Instead 
they opted for holding “[t]he carrier liable for damage sustained in case of death or bodily 
injury of a passenger”.99 The reason behind such legislative choice was the concern that the 
litigation floodgates would open with the inevitable increase of the premium level. It was 
understood that “[t]he expression ‘personal’ injury would open the door to non-physical 
personal injuries such as slander, libel, discrimination, fear, fright, and apprehension…”.100 
In that respect, case law in the context of the aviation conventions both in the United 
Kingdom
101
 and the United States of America
102
 cannot be used as guidance in the 
interpretation of the Athens Protocol. Still a few thoughts are required to demonstrate the 
difficulties that courts have encountered in distinguishing between bodily injury and personal 
injury. The courts’ main concern was to decide whether the term “bodily injury” would cover 
any kind of mental injury, an exercise that became more difficult following the disagreement 
over the scope of the original French term “lesion corporelle” in the original WC.103 
Following a number of (sometimes conflicting) decisions at both sides of the Atlantic, the 
consensus is that “there can be no recovery for psychic injury which is unaccompanied by 
physical injury”104—with “accompanied by” meaning that there is a causal link between the 
physical injury and the mental injury, and not the other way around.
105
 Most importantly, it is 
obvious from the discussions over the scope of the term “bodily injury” that any change to 
“personal injury” (as in the case of the Guatemala City Protocol) would permit recovery for 
standalone mental injuries. Not surprisingly, aviation insurance policies also make 
distinctions along the same lines. Major air carriers would often define “bodily” injury in an 
extensive manner to cover standalone mental anguish, fright and shock, while policies 
                                                          
97
 For instance, in Kotai v. The Queen of the North [2009] B.C.S.C. 1405 (Can.)it was presumed that 
compensation for physiological injuries is recoverable under the Marine Liability Act, 2001 S.C., c. 6 which 
incorporates the Athens Convention 1974.  
98
 Except for the GCP, supra note 26, that never came into force. Its art. 17 provided that the “carrier is liable 
for damage sustained in case of death or personal injury of a passenger upon condition only that the event which 
caused the death or injury took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking 
or disembarking”. It also provided the qualification that the carrier will not be liable “if the death or injury 
resulted solely from the state of health of the passenger”.   
99
 MC, supra note 1, art. 17;  WCS, art. 17. 
100
 SHAWCROSS AND BEAUMONT, supra note 45, ¶ 704. 
101
 King (AP) v. Bristow Helicopters Ltd. [2002] UKHL 7, [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 745 (appeal taken from Scot.). 
102
 It was held by the Supreme Court in Eastern Airlines Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530 (1991) that the Warsaw 
Convention, supra note 1, art. 17 did not permit recovery for mental injury unaccompanied by physical injury. It 
should be borne in mind that at the Montreal Convention diplomatic conference in 1999, Sweden’s proposal that 
there should be a separate head of claim for mental injury was withdrawn as a result of strong resistance coming 
from the airline and insurance lobby.   
103
 The German and French delegates at the Conference leading to the drafting of the Montreal Convention 1999 
argued that the term covers mental injuries. For more information on the debate, see SHAWCROSS AND 
BEAUMONT, supra note 45, ¶ 704.   
104
 SHAWCROSS AND BEAUMONT, supra note 45, ¶ 706. 
105
 Id. ¶ 708.   
addressed to general aviation users (such as AVN1D) would define “bodily injury” as 
including “bodily injury, sickness or disease including death at any time resulting 
therefrom”.106 
  
A related but more difficult question is whether a passenger could claim damages for distress 
or vexation following breach of the contract of carriage from a non-shipping related incident. 
Imagine the position of a passenger who misses most of the sightseeing and trips after 
suffering from food poisoning as a result of a meal served at the restaurant of a cruise liner. 
As far as the English law is concerned, it has been confirmed by the highest judicial authority 
that this kind of damages for breach of contract can be awarded in a group of cases in which 
at least one of the “major and important” objects of the contract was to provide “pleasure, 
relaxation, and peace of mind”.107 It is hardly an overstatement to suggest that one of the 
major and important objects of a contract for a cruise in the Caribbean is pleasure and 
relaxation.
108
 It is, therefore, plausible under English law that a passenger who is on a cruise 
and suffers distress as a result of a non-shipping related incident could bring an action for 
breach of contract. However, a similar outcome is highly unlikely with regard to other 
contracts of carriage concerning passengers. Also, a completely different outcome is possible 
in other Contracting States.  
Claims for distress are destined to fail under the aviation conventions on the basis that the 
passenger in question has suffered no bodily injury. Claims for breach of the carriage contract 
(other than non-performance of the contract, which falls outside the scope of the conventions) 
or misrepresentation will also fail, since the conventions are the exclusive avenue for a 
passenger to claim against an air carrier by satisfying the requirements of Art 17. Any other 
interpretation would undermine the scope of the conventions as it would effectively allow the 
recovery of non-bodily damages. Such claims often originate from business class passengers 
who complain about the quality of the service offered by the air carrier. For example, a 
passenger brought a claim for misrepresentation (under English law) against SAA on the 
basis that, contrary to the carrier’s adverts, his business class seat was not reclining fully.109 
His claim failed because he could not satisfy the requirements of Art 17. Similarly, a business 
class passenger recently claimed loss of amenity because Qantas did not offer the usual 
standard of service as a result of a strike in South Africa.
110
 Yet again, the claim was 
dismissed on the basis that the claimant suffered no bodily injury. The authors believe that 
the example of the air law conventions shall be followed by the Athens regime; allowing such 
actions to run in parallel to the conventions would seriously undermine their effectiveness.  
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Courts have also accepted that the same is true with respect to delay claims under Art 19 of 
the aviation conventions, which reads as follows: “The carrier is liable for damage 
occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, baggage or cargo”; Art 19 does not 
permit the recovery of a passenger’s psychological, emotional injury or inconvenience and 
loss of vacation caused by delay.
111
 
Another grey area is the type of damages that can be claimed by passengers for the loss of or 
damage to cabin luggage. Article 1(7) of the Athens Convention 2002 provides that “loss of 
or damage to luggage includes pecuniary loss resulting from the luggage not having been re-
delivered to the passenger within a reasonable time after the arrival of the ship on which the 
luggage has been or should have been carried, but does not include delays resulting from 
labour disputes.” In common law, pecuniary loss arising out of breach of contract takes two 
main forms. First, there is what is called normal pecuniary loss—that is, loss that any 
claimant would likely suffer because of the breach. Essentially, this is the difference between 
the value of the performance as contracted for and its value as in fact tendered. In cases 
where the luggage is lost, this will be the value of the luggage; and in cases of damage to the 
luggage, this will be the diminution in its value. Secondly, there is consequential loss, which 
is the expenditure or loss of profit over and above the loss of or diminution in the value of the 
immediate subject matter of the contract. Given that the construction of the word “pecuniary 
loss” is left to national courts, it is debatable to what extent consequential loss of the latter 
type is recoverable. However, even if it is assumed that this kind of damages is recoverable, 
there is the burning question of whether this holds true in case of cabin luggage. The scenario 
which comes to mind is a passenger whose laptop computer is lost as a result of a shipping 
related incident. If the passenger proves that the laptop contained information that would 
have helped him/her to secure a lucrative contract, would he/she be able to claim 
compensation for consequential loss over the value of the laptop to the limitation amount 
specified in Article 8 of the Convention? The authors believe that this is unlikely. Cabin 
luggage has been described under Article 1(6) of the Convention as “luggage which the 
passenger has in his cabin or is otherwise in his possession, custody or control”. As the terms 
“luggage” and “cabin luggage” have been described separately under the Convention112 and 
Article 1(7) only refers to the former, it is logical to suggest that the intention of the 
draftsmen was to exclude cabin luggage from this provision.
113
        
The aviation conventions use the generic term “damage” without clarifying the meaning of 
the term, leaving its interpretation to national courts. Case law suggests that consequential 
losses of the latter type are recoverable, subject to the prohibition of recovering punitive, 
exemplary or any other non-compensatory damages.
114
 Yet, such an approach is not 
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compatible with the Athens regime as the wording of the aviation conventions is wider, 
leaving more leeway to national laws.  
On the assumption that Article 1(7) of the Convention is not relevant in the context of cabin 
luggage, another interesting question is whether the passenger could claim damages for 
distress when the cabin luggage is not delivered by the carrier to a cruise ship passenger. 
Could a passenger, for example, claim that being deprived of his/her cabin luggage meant 
that he/she could not manage to attend formal dinners and various events on board the cruise 
liner, causing him/her anxiety and distress? There is no provision dealing with an eventuality 
of this kind in the Athens Convention, but neither is there any provision preventing an action 
of this nature. In practice, cruise operators offer passengers who find themselves in this kind 
of predicament vouchers that can be used to purchase their next cruise ticket at a discounted 
rate. However, the authors believe that courts in some Contracting States could entertain an 
action of this nature from passengers.  
The consensus among courts is that damages for distress in case a baggage is lost or delayed 
are not recoverable under the aviation conventions. Yet courts occasionally divert from the 
this line and award damages for distress “on the basis that they… compensate them for the 
stress, inconvenience, frustration and disruption to their holiday occasioned… by the delay in 
the arrival of their baggage…”.115 Still, this is surely not a universal approach. 
 
D) Contribution Claims 
Naturally, the Athens Convention is designed to be the sole framework by which a passenger 
can claim against the carrier or the contractual carrier. Hence, Article 14 of the Convention 
stipulates: 
No action for damages for the death of or personal injury to a passenger, or for the loss of 
or damage to luggage, shall be brought against a carrier or performing carrier otherwise 
than in accordance with this Convention. 
There is nothing extraordinary in this and it can be viewed as a price passengers need to pay 
in return for the protection that they are provided with by the Convention regime. However, 
could this Article ensure that the provisions of the Athens Convention apply when a claim is 
brought by a third party against the carrier? This was the central issue in Kathleen Feest v. 
South West Strategic Health Authority et al.
116
 There, the claimant was injured on a boat trip 
that was arranged by her employers as part of a team building exercise. The claimant brought 
an action against her employers on the basis that they failed to undertake a proper risk 
assessment and/or implement a safe system of work for her on the occasion of this boat 
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outing. After the expiry of the time bar provision in the Athens Convention,
117
 the employers 
of the claimant brought a claim for contribution against the owners of the boat that the 
employee was on at the time of the incident (carrier). The carrier issued an application to 
strike out the third-party claim on the basis that Article 16 of the Athens Convention 
extinguished the cause of action, and, therefore, the limitation period had expired prior to the 
commencement of the third-party proceedings. Although it was held in lower courts that 
Article 16 had the effect of extinguishing the cause of action and struck out the third-party 
claim for contribution, the Court of Appeal disagreed, holding that: i) a claim for contribution 
under s. 1(1) of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 was not a claim for damages for 
personal injury to a passenger brought against a carrier and therefore not within the scope of 
the Convention, and accordingly not subject to the time bar imposed by article 16(1) of the 
Convention; ii) the carrier’s liability under the 1978 Act to contribute was nevertheless 
dependent on its liability to the claimant as the passenger, which was governed by Athens 
Convention. On true construction Article 16 of the Convention, although barring an action for 
damages brought after a period of two years, did not extinguish the right on which the action 
was based; and that, accordingly, since the claim for contribution was based on that right (and 
not on that action) it had not been extinguished by article 16(1).   
The Court of Appeal was of the view that a claim for contribution brought by a third party to 
the carrier has a life of its own deriving from the relevant English domestic statute 
entitlement to contribution. This kind of reasoning severs the link between the Athens 
Convention and a claim for contribution. Effectively, it is suggested that a contribution claim 
has nothing to do with the Athens Convention and is not, therefore, subject to the time bar 
provisions of the Convention, although the liability of the carrier to contribute is critically on 
its own liability to the passenger, which in turn is governed by the provisions of the 
Convention! Taking this to its natural conclusion, the Athens Convention would be critical in 
determining the liability of the carrier and the limits of such liability, but its time bar 
provisions should simply be ignored and give way to the time bar provisions stipulated in 
national legislation.  
The judgment clearly demonstrates that in some jurisdictions contribution claims by third 
parties against the carrier could potentially be treated as distinct from the Convention regime. 
The authors believe that this opens the door to bypass the Convention regime and make 
carriers subject to a different legal regime, an outcome which is clearly not in the spirit of 
Article 14. Still, this could have been avoided if the time bar provision in the Convention had 
been construed to have the effect of extinguishing the right for an action rather than simply 
barring the remedy of court proceedings. However, this was also rejected by the Court of 
Appeal. Although in continental jurisdictions time bar provisions usually have the effect of 
extinguishing the right for an action, the Court of Appeal was adamant that the wording used 
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in Article 16(1) of the Athens Convention would not have the same effect under English 
law.
118
  
The effect of the decision of the Court of Appeal is that a carrier who might otherwise have 
availed themself of a limitation defence under the Athens Convention in circumstances where 
the two-year limitation period has expired now could potentially face another route of claim 
brought against them by third parties as a claim for contribution. For a claim of this nature, 
clearly the time bar of the Athens Convention will not bite. The authors are firmly of the view 
that this outcome has the potential of undermining the Athens regime by allowing third 
parties to bring contribution claims from the backdoor that would have been barred under the 
Convention. However, problems of this nature might arise in other Contracting States and the 
authors believe that this is something that should be avoided at any cost.     
Conversely, Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention and Art 35 of the Montreal Convention 
leave no doubt that the time bar provision extinguishes any right:  
The right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within a period of 
two years, reckoned from the date of arrival at the destination, or from the date on which 
the aircraft ought to have arrived, or from the date on which the carriage stopped.  
Courts have held that the right for an action is “completely destroyed and not merely 
rendered unenforceable by action. It follows that it cannot be relied upon by way of defence 
to an action brought by the carrier.”119 In that respect, the debate in Kathleen Feest would 
have been resolved in favour of the air carrier if such case had arisen in the context of the air 
liability conventions. However, matters get complicated when an indemnification action is 
filed from a liable carrier against third parties or is filed against the air carrier by a liable third 
party. The reason for such uncertainty is that there is little judicial consensus on how to treat 
such indemnification actions.  
With the objective of achieving such consensus, Art 37 MC indicates that “[n]othing in this 
Convention shall prejudice the question whether a person liable for damage in accordance 
with its provisions has a right of recourse against any other person.” The wording of Art 37 
MC makes clear that actions of indemnification initiated by carriers against third parties 
which are not subject to the Convention do not come into the scope of the MC, which 
includes the two-year limitation period, leaving their determination to national laws.
120
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 Under English law the limitation period would be governed by the Limitation Act 1980, c. 58, § 10 (Eng.) 
which provides that the limitation is “two years from the date on which that right accrued”. 
Still, the wording leaves open the question whether the MC applies to indemnification actions 
filed by liable third parties which are subject to the MC, such a ground-handler or a 
contracting carrier, against an actual carrier for damage falling into the MC (e.g., the death of 
a passenger on board an aircraft). With exceptions, a consensus seems to be developing under 
the MC with Courts in the US holding that such actions are not subject to the Convention on 
the basis that they take a life of their own and they are not any more actions for damages.
121
 
Still, these decisions have been criticised on the basis that they create an artificial distinction 
between action for damages and indemnification.
122
 Under English law, s. 5(2) of the 
Carriage by Air Act 1961 provides that the limitation provisions of the aviation conventions 
do not apply “to any proceedings for contribution between persons liable for any damage to 
which any of the Carriage by Air Conventions relates”. As such, s. 1(3) of the Civil Liability 
(Contribution) Act 1978 applies and provides that the carrier remains liable to contribute until 
its own liability under the aviation conventions is extinguished (i.e., replicates the two-year 
limitation period of the aviation conventions).  
The WCS does not contain any provisions on the right of indemnification, with the decision 
of the Supreme Court of Ontario in Connaught Laboratories Ltd. v. Air Canada being 
influential with respect to claims between air carriers:
123
  
[s]uch claims are not included, nor does it appear that they are intended to be included, 
within the purview of The Warsaw Convention which… deals with the claims of 
passengers, consignors and consignees, and the liability of carriers therefore, it does not 
deal with the claims of carriers inter se.
124
  
Still, there is no judicial consensus with respect to indemnity claims, with conflicting 
decisions been taken within the same jurisdiction:  
In a number of Warsaw Convention cases in the United States it was held that art 29 of 
that Convention applied to recourse actions against carriers and a French court, in a case 
in which the principal claim was against a handling-agent who sought contribution from 
a carrier, held that art 29 did apply, as it drew no distinction between principal and 
recourse actions. Some decisions of US District Courts have held art 29 applicable to 
claims for contribution against carriers and their handling agents; but it has been held in 
other District Court cases that the Convention rule does not apply to a claim by a carrier 
against its own handling-agent though it would to recourse actions against carriers. A 
decision of the French Cour de Cassation has held that the Convention limitation 
provision does not protect handling-agents in actions for contribution brought by carriers, 
even if the contract between the carrier and the handling-agent incorporated the Warsaw 
Convention in general terms.
125
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Most recently, the French Cour de Cassation, in a heavily criticised decision,
126
 confirmed 
that an indemnification action filed by the aircraft manufacturer against the air carrier 
(resulting from passengers’ death claims covered by the original WC) is not subject to the 
two-year limitation period.  
In the authors’ view, indemnification claims should also come under the air liability regimes, 
as any contrary solution would have the effect of undermining the international liability 
regime. It is interesting to see that disputes regarding the scope of an international liability 
regime still arise, although it is expressly stipulated in the relevant Conventions that the right 
to damages shall be extinguished. The aviation experience on the issue of indemnification 
claims highlights that the failure of the Athens Convention regime to expressly stipulate the 
effect of its time bar provisions has invited controversy and possibly hindered the prospect of 
achieving uniformity. States considering the ratification of the Convention should consider 
seriously addressing this point in their implementing legislation.    
 
E) Jurisdictional Issues 
Article 17 of the Athens Convention 2002 is designed to provide a number of alternative 
forums for the passengers to bring their claim against the carriers (contractual or 
performing).
127
 Accordingly, Article 17(1) stipulates:   
An action arising under Articles 3 and 4 of this Convention shall, at the option of the 
claimant, be brought before one of the courts listed below, provided that the court is 
located in a State Party to this Convention, and subject to the domestic law of each State 
Party governing proper venue within those States with multiple possible forums:  
(a) the court of the State of permanent residence or principal place of business of the 
defendant, or  
(b) the court of the State of departure or that of the destination according to the contract 
of carriage, or  
(c) the court of the State of the domicile or permanent residence of the claimant, if the 
defendant has a place of business and is subject to jurisdiction in that State, or 
 (d) the court of the State where the contract of carriage was made, if the defendant has a 
place of business and is subject to jurisdiction in that State. 
 
The authors are firmly of the view that a number of difficulties are likely to arise in 
determining which court (if any) would have jurisdiction to hear a claim brought by a 
passenger against the carrier. Let us assume that the carrier is a company that has its principal 
place of business in a tax heaven which is not a party to either version of the Athens 
Convention. Also, assume that the place of departure and destination according to the 
contract of carriage is not in a country to which the Athens regime applies. The passenger, on 
the other hand, is domiciled in a state which has implemented the Athens regime into its legal 
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system and has purchased the ticket from an independent agent working on behalf of the 
carrier in the same jurisdiction. Would that be adequate to enable the passenger to bring an 
action against the carrier in the jurisdiction in which he/she is domiciled? The answer to that 
question depends on whether, for the purposes of Article 17(c) or (d), the defendant carrier 
could be deemed to have a place of business in that jurisdiction simply because it performs its 
business through the office of an independent agent registered in that jurisdiction. Or 
alternatively, is it necessary that the defendant carrier has an office registered in its name in 
that jurisdiction? In various jurisdictions, the actions of travel agents, although they are paid 
commission by the carrier for booking reservations, disseminating brochures and advertising 
magazines, were not deemed sufficient to confer jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.
128
  
The WCS permits claims to be filed before the courts of the State Party in which the carrier is 
ordinarily resident, or has its principal place of business, or has an establishment by which 
the contract has been made, or is the final destination of the carriage in question.
129
  
In MC these four grounds of jurisdiction are retained (with minor changes of the wording) 
and a fifth jurisdiction has been added. Article 33(2)MC provides that an action for damages 
arising from the death or injury of a passenger (no cargo claims) must be brought, at the 
option of the claimant, in the territory of the State Party “in which at the time of the accident 
the passenger had his or her principal and permanent residence and to or from which the 
carrier operates services for the carriage of passengers by air, either on its own aircraft, or on 
another carrier's aircraft pursuant to a commercial agreement, and in which that carrier 
conducts its business of carriage of passengers by air from premises leased or owned by the 
carrier itself or by another carrier with which it has a commercial agreement”.130 
Interestingly enough, the WCS does not permit claims to be filed before the court of the 
victims’ residence, a deliberate omission to protect the carrier from facing claims arising 
from one accident in as many jurisdictions as the residences of passengers carried in the 
aircraft. Even during the drafting of the MC there was no consensus in adopting it as a forum. 
Yet, the insistence of the US, which strongly advocated that its inclusion will protect 
passengers, has paid off. The compromise was to include the “fifth jurisdiction” on the 
condition that the defendant carrier has a strong commercial presence (operates services alone 
or a commercial agreement such as code-sharing and owns or leases a place of business) in 
the place of residency of the victim. Courts have not examined the “commercial presence” 
requirements, yet the MC wording would have clarified Art 17(c) of the Athens Convention: 
performing the services via an independent contractor or a travel agent will not satisfy the 
requirement as the Article clearly requires the premises to be leased or owned by the 
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defendant carrier (independent contractors would fail this test) or at least by another carrier 
with whom the defendant has a commercial agreement (travel agents would not qualify as 
carriers).   
Having said that, the aviation conventions could also contribute to the debate under Art 17(1) 
(d) of the Athens Convention. Both of them provide that the passenger can bring an action 
where the carrier has a place of business through which the contract has been made, provided 
it is located in a State Party.
131
 Inevitably this provision has raised questions on the 
jurisdictional implications of air carriers cooperating with agents in various countries. The 
prevailing view in aviation cases (in common law jurisdictions) is that a “carrier’s 
establishment” should not necessarily “be directly owned by the carrier, as is required in 
French decisions”.132 Still, conducting business via an “ordinary agent”, such as an interline 
sales agent or an agent who sells tickets on a commission basis, would not be sufficient to 
qualify its establishment as the carrier’s establishment. A closer business relation with the 
agent is required in order to confer jurisdiction over a foreign air carrier.  
The matters could get more complicated in the scenario above if the ticket is purchased by the 
passenger through the Internet. There will be issues concerning where the contract is formed 
in that instance that will be determined by the application of national law. Yet more 
significantly, how will the place of business of the defendant be determined in that case for 
these purposes? There is little case examining this issue in the aviation conventions, despite 
the prevalence of electronic tickets under the MC. At the moment, it seems that “the preferred 
view in the US is that in the case of an Internet purchase, the place is where the purchasing 
passenger has received, through the Internet, confirmation of the purchase of the 
transportation…. In most cases this will be the residence of the purchasing person, even 
though the air carrier’s Internet sales computer website may be located in another country.”133 
Last but not least, there is the issue of at what stage the defendant carrier must be subject to 
the jurisdiction of the courts for the purposes of this Article. Imagine a situation where the 
carrier has a place of business in the jurisdiction specified in Article 17(a), (c) or (d) at the 
time when the injury, loss or damage occurs, but it ceases to operate in that jurisdiction by the 
time the claim under the Convention is put forward. This is a difficult question to answer but 
it is possible that by ceasing to operate in that jurisdiction the carrier also ceases its capability 
to be involved in litigation as a claimant or defendant. At the same time, the application of 
the convention is determined by reference to the time of injury, death or loss rather than the 
time of filling the claim. As such, it is plausible (and arguably a fairer solutions) that the 
jurisdictional status of the carrier is determined by reference to the former moment.  
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 F) Regime for Valuables  
The Athens Convention creates a separate liability regime for valuables. Accordingly, Article 
5 of the Convention stipulates: 
The carrier shall not be liable for the loss of or damage to monies, negotiable securities, 
gold, silverware, jewellery, ornaments, works of art, or other valuables, except where 
such valuables have been deposited with the carrier for the agreed purpose of safe-
keeping in which case the carrier shall be liable up to the limit provided for in paragraph 
3 of Article 8 unless a higher limit is agreed upon in accordance with paragraph 1 of 
Article 10. 
  
The authors appreciate the justification for treating valuables in a different manner compared 
to other types of property, particularly in the light of the fact that passengers on lengthy 
cruise voyages might look for the cooperation of the carrier to protect their valuables. Yet, it 
is evident that the liability regime created by Article 5 is not entirely unproblematic. The 
authors wish to underscore three major complications. First, Article 5 is designed under the 
assumption that the passengers will be allowed by the carrier to deposit such valuables for 
safekeeping. It is not clear in the Convention what happens if the carrier refuses to provide a 
facility for the passengers depositing their valuables. The issue was considered, in passing, by 
Judge Hallgarten QC in Lee v. Airtours Holidays.
134
 He expressed the view that in such an 
instance a separate cause of action would have arisen based on an implied contractual claim 
for non-provision of safekeeping facilities. The carriers would, therefore, have been liable 
under this separate cause of action, even if not under Article 5 directly. The measure of 
damages would have been the amount which the claimants would have otherwise recovered 
on the assumption that the Convention applied. Thus, the passengers could have claimed 
indirectly what Article 5 prevented them from claiming. Emanating from a County Court, the 
judgment does not have a binding effect but, nevertheless, the authors find its reasoning 
sound. Conceptually, there is no reason why Article 5 could not be the source of an implied 
contractual duty, considering that this Article stipulates that the carrier will only be 
responsible for valuables as long as they are deposited for safekeeping.  
Second, the Article does not give an indication as to what the basis of liability of the carrier 
will be for valuables deposited for safekeeping. Would, for example, the liability of the 
carrier be strict or absolute? If the ship sinks as a result of terrorism, would the carrier be able 
to exonerate itself from liability for valuables deposited for safekeeping on the basis that the 
cause of the loss is occasioned from one of the exceptions stipulated in Article 3(1) of the 
Athens Convention?
135
 Or would the carrier be liable to the passenger regardless? The 
language of Article 5 does not help in unpicking this conundrum. However, it should be 
noted that for valuables deposited for safekeeping, the carrier has ultimate control and is 
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expected to make use of a safe or similar facility that offers maximum degree of protection. 
Put differently, the care exercised for the safekeeping of such valuables is considerably 
higher than the care exercised for other types of property left in the care of the carrier. On 
that basis, the authors believe that the liability regime should be an absolute one with only a 
number of common law defences allowed (i.e., those allowed for common carriers): act of 
nature, act of public enemies, and fault or fraud by the passenger. That said, it is rather 
uncertain that the issue will be dealt with in the same manner in all Contracting States.  
Last but not least, it is rather debatable whether the jurisdiction provisions of the 2002 
version of the Convention, encapsulated in Article 17, would apply to disputes with regard to 
valuables. This is because the new version of the Article specifically stipulates that the 
jurisdiction provisions of the Convention applies to actions concerning personal injury or 
death or loss of or damage to property (Article 3 and 4 of the Convention), making no 
reference to Article 5 of the Convention which sets out the liability regime for valuables.
136
 
The travaux préparatoires do not make it clear whether this was simply an oversight or 
whether it was intended that jurisdiction arrangements of the Athens Convention do not apply 
with regard to valuables deposited for safekeeping to enable parties to make alternative 
jurisdictional agreements. There is no evidence that this matter was discussed during the 
build-up to the 2002 Convention, raising the suspicion that this was simply an oversight; but 
one can also see a counter argument being put forward in a coherent manner.              
 
IV. An All Inclusive Passenger Regime? 
The primary objective of the Athens regime is to provide a compensation regime for 
passengers travelling by sea for death and personal injury claims, as well as loss and damage 
to their luggage. In the previous parts of this article, aspects of the regime that could create 
uncertainty in Contracting States have been deliberated and suggestions have been made as to 
how such difficulties could be addressed with reference to various sources, in particular to 
other similar liability regimes used in other modes of transport. These issues apart, it is fair to 
say that the Convention is capable of providing a sound liability regime,
137
 which is essential 
not only for the protection of passengers, but also for the smooth operation of an international 
liability insurance regime which is invariably provided by P & I Clubs.     
However, no State considering the ratification of either version of the Convention should 
assume that the Athens regime provides a one-stop legal regime for all eventualities that can 
adversely affect experience of passengers carried by sea. The issues that would fall outside 
the Athens regime will be briefly mentioned below. The analysis intends to illustrate the 
areas that states implementing Athens Convention into their system should consider to 
regulate in order to improve the rights of passengers in their legal system.        
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 A) Shore Excursions 
On cruise ships, shore excursions—such as scuba diving, visits to archaeological sites, 
horseback riding, and parasailing—are promoted to passengers as they provide high profit 
margins for cruise liners. It is also worth noting that such tours are invariably delivered by 
independent contractors
138
 and cruise liners often include into the contracts provisions 
disclaiming liability for any injuries that passengers might sustain during a shore 
excursion.
139
  
The carrier is responsible under the Athens regime for personal injury and death claims 
during the period when the passenger is on board the ship or in the course of embarkation and 
disembarkation.
140
 Given that the terms “embarkation” and “disembarkation” have not been 
qualified in any shape or form, it is very likely that the carrier’s responsibility continues 
during the period when the passenger disembarks from the ship for a shore excursion or when 
he/she embarks on the ship on the way back. However, it is also evident that the carrier bears 
no responsibility during the period when the passenger is off the ship engaged in a shore 
excursion. Subject to the requirements of the law that applies to the contract,
141
 there is no 
reason why the carrier could not exclude its liability for personal injury incurred during a 
shore excursion. That said, it should be borne in mind that in some jurisdictions attempts 
                                                          
138
 Cruise liners often hold out themselves as agents of such independent contractors. 
139
 Unfortunately, such accidents are rather common.  
140
 Athens Convention 1974, supra note 3, art. 1 § 8. In each case, whether “embarkation” or “disembarkation” 
is completed is a question of fact. In Collins v. Lawrence [2017] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 13 (Canterbury Cty. Ct.) (Eng.) 
on returning to shore from a fishing trip, the claimant disembarked by stepping from the boat onto a platform at 
the top of a set of free standing steps which led down onto the shingle. When the claimant stepped onto the 
shingle he slipped and fell, sustaining personal injury. The judge found that the accident was caused by the 
claimant’s stepping onto a large plywood board that had been placed on the shingle at the foot of the steps. It 
was held that the “disembarkation” was not completed until the claimant was established safely on the shingle 
beach. The function of the plywood board was to aid the passenger’s disembarkation down the steps onto the 
shingle. Accordingly, it was held that the accident occurred while the claimant was still disembarking from the 
boat, hence the Athens Convention was applicable. The terms “embarkation” and “disembarkation” are the 
subject of extensive case law in aviation, as the carrier is liable for an accident that causes death or bodily injury 
to the passenger from the moment he/she is in the course of embarkation, while on board and until 
disembarkation from the aircraft. Inevitably, the question of whether the passenger’s movement is “controlled” 
by the air carrier becomes crucial with a number of tests being devised by Courts, especially in the US, to 
identify this moment. In a nutshell, cases in the US and the UK suggest that the passenger will be in the process 
of embarkation from the moment he/she is “called into the gate-lounge immediately prior to boarding…(even if 
the carrier acts through personnel employed by the airport)”. Even when the passenger is subject to special 
assistance at the airport, accidents that take place while the passenger moves in the terminal building while 
waiting for the gate to open shall not be the responsibility of the air carrier. Similarly, case law in common law 
jurisdictions suggests that disembarkation is completed “once the passengers safely reach a point within the 
terminal”. As a result, accidents that take place while the passenger walks on the apron towards the terminal 
building or while he/she is in the bus taking him/her from the aircraft to the terminal building fall into art. 17. 
The bus might be driven by an employee of the ground-handler, yet it will not absolve the carrier from liability 
towards the passenger; it might, though, give the carrier indemnification rights against the ground-handler. At 
the same time, accidents that take place at the baggage carousel (e.g., while the passenger lifts her/his baggage), 
or while waiting for clearance from the border control authorities, have been held to be outside the scope of 
responsibility of the air carrier. For extensive case law on this matter, see SHAWCROSS AND BEAUMONT, supra 
note 45, ¶¶ 720-722. 
141
 If the carriage contract is subject to English law; for example, the Consumer Rights Act 2015, c.15 (U.K.) 
might be relevant in this context.  
have been made to hold cruise liners liable in addition to operators of shore excursions on the 
premise that the cruise liner is in breach of the duty to warn of dangerous environments
142
 or 
has acted negligently in selection of shore excursion operators.
143
 The extent to which such 
attempts have a chance to succeed varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but the key issue 
here is that the carrier has no liability to passengers for personal injury sustained during shore 
excursions under the Athens regime.    
      
B) Misrepresentation and Discomfort on Board a Ship  
The Athens regime also does not attempt to provide a legal remedy for passengers 
complaining about deceptive marketing practices. For example, a passenger alleging that the 
accommodation provided on a cruise is rather different than what has been advertised will 
need to seek a remedy under the law that applies to the contract;
144
 although interesting 
conflict of law issues could arise in cases where the ticket has been purchased through the 
Internet. Similarly, the Convention does not cover liability in respect of quality complaints 
which might arise in context of a cruise. Such matters need to be dealt with under the 
applicable national law.
145
 As discussed above, claims for misrepresentation fall into the 
ambit of the air law conventions on the basis of the exclusivity principle. Such claims usually 
fail, as they do not meet the requirements of Art 17, with the exclusivity principle prohibiting 
such claims from being re-litigated under the cloak of a domestic cause of action.    
 
C) Crew’s Misconduct 
As far as non-shipping incidents are concerned, under the Athens regime the carrier is 
responsible for the fault or neglect of its servants
146
 as long as they act within the scope of 
their employment.
147
 It is not unlikely, particularly on cruise ships, that the passengers might 
be subjected to verbal or even sexual abuse of the crew. It is submitted that the crew involved 
in misconduct of that nature cannot be held to be acting within the scope of their 
employment. If so, any claim that passengers would bring against such crew should be dealt 
with outside the Athens regime. This would naturally mean that the crew facing such an 
action will not have the benefit of limitation provisions that appear in the Convention. It is 
also worth noting that the jurisdiction provisions set out in the Convention
148
 would be 
irrelevant in this context. In some jurisdictions outside the Athens regime, cruise liners have 
been occasionally held vicariously liable for the verbal and sexual misconduct of their 
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employees.
149
 However, the authors believe that this would be beyond the Athens Convention 
regime, which stresses that the carrier is responsible for the actions of its employees that are 
within the scope of their employment.  
The matter might be more convoluted in instances where a shipping related incident is 
brought about deliberately by an employee. For example, if a collision occurs as a result of 
deliberate actions of the master, would personal injury claims put forward by passengers be 
within the scope of the Convention? The carrier under the Athens Convention 2002 is strictly 
liable for personal injury arising from a shipping incident unless the incident arises from an 
act of war, hostilities, etc. or was wholly caused by an act of omission done with the intent to 
cause the incident by a third party. On that basis, it is submitted that the carrier might be 
liable under the Athens regime for such claims.
150
  
 
D) Cancellations        
Perhaps an obvious point, but it is worth noting that the Athens regime does not deal with 
losses arising as a result of cancellations, port skipping or unannounced itinerary changes. In 
the absence of legislation dealing with the matter,
151
 what happens in such instances is 
regulated by the contract or policies adopted by various cruise liners.  
 
V. Conclusions 
Given that the main focus of the article is problematic aspects of the Athens regime, one 
might be forgiven for thinking that the liability regime created by this international 
instrument is far from satisfactory. However, this does not reflect the view of the authors. It is 
submitted that the Athens regime provides a sound liability regime not only for passengers 
but also for carriers and their liability insurers. The comparison between international sea and 
air liability conventions illustrates that no regime is immune from litigation, and 
interpretation of provisions of international instruments may vary from one Contracting State 
to another.
152
  
Of course, readers might legitimately ask two questions: i) Why is ratification of the Athens 
convention relatively low compared to international air carriage regimes?; and ii) Why is 
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there not much case law on the aspects of the Athens Convention in Contracting States? The 
answer to the first question is not straightforward. But one reason could be that air travel is a 
relatively new venture, and as indicated in Part II of this article, it has been viewed from the 
outset as a risky engagement. This led to the rapid development of legal rules attempting to 
provide a comprehensive liability regime, and states, presumably under political pressure, 
opted to be part of the set of international instruments developed. Sea carriers, on the other 
hand, have traditionally enjoyed freedom of contract, and even when international rules have 
been developed to regulate their carriers’ liability, financial limits of liability imposed by the 
Athens regime have been the cause of discontent and certainly hampered much wider 
acceptance of the regime throughout the world. For example, the limits set by the Athens 
Convention 1974 were regarded as too low by most European states, Australia and Canada. 
To the contrary, some states in East Asia have eschewed the Athens Convention 1974 on the 
basis that the limits were too high.
153
 Conversely, the answer to the second question is 
relatively easy and perhaps is an indication that the Athens Convention works relatively well 
in practice. The liability insurers, usually P & I clubs, which handle passenger claims on 
behalf of carriers, operate rather efficiently within the parameters set by the Athens regime; 
and in most instances an agreement is reached with the claimant passenger, making it 
unnecessary to take the case to the courts.
154
  
On a more specific level, the conclusions of the authors are: 
i) Certain aspects of the Athens regime are in need of further clarification, 
especially the following: scope of the regime, definition of “shipping 
incident”, types of damages recoverable, legal position with regard to 
contribution claims, and jurisdiction provisions when the carrier uses agents or 
when the sale is concluded on the Internet. The solutions adopted by air 
liability conventions might shed light on some of these problems, but it is 
ultimately recommended that states considering the ratification of the Athens 
Conventions should address these issues in implementing legislation. 
ii) It should be noted that the Athens regime does not deal with all legal matters 
concerning carriage of passengers by sea. To provide comprehensive coverage 
in this area, states need to consider supplementing the Athens regime with 
national legislation to deal with such issues as cancellations and delays. 
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